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Watch 1307

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**WATCH COMMITTEE
of the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE**

Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions

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From: 28 June 1951
To : 3 July 1951
Washington 25, D. C.
5 July 1951

SUMMARY OF INDICATIONS DURING PERIOD

1. **KOREA:** Despite the agreement of the Chinese Communists and North Koreans to undertake cease-fire discussions, there continues to be no indication of the nature of the guarantees which they will ask or their terms for a political settlement. It is possible that the Communists believe they may secure their objectives through protracted negotiations. The continued build-up of their military power indicates that they are attempting to negotiate from a position of strength while enhancing their capabilities for further military action. Evidence of the continuing build-up of enemy ground strength includes substantial vehicle sightings, PW reports of plans for a new offensive and of the presence of new Chinese Communist armies in Korea, persistent although unconfirmed reports of a CCF mechanized force, and numerous reports that the U.S.S.R. is reequipping the Chinese Communist armies. Reports of large numbers of Soviet troops in Korea are not substantiated but their presence in small numbers is well established. There is evidence of an extension of the area of MIG-15 defensive deployment in Manchuria and North China, and there has been further marked improvement in the efficiency of enemy AA in Korea. Reports [redacted] state that "the CCAF bomber command" has 800 bombers at its disposal and that a Chinese Communist airborne division is to be moved from Tientsin to Antung. Various [redacted] reports also state that large forces are being built up for an offensive if peace negotiations fail and that Chinese Communist military preparations are scheduled to be completed by late summer.

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2. **CHINA:** Two reports of recent Chinese Communist joint maneuvers in South-Central China may indicate that these forces are attaining a higher degree of readiness. There are also [redacted] reports of increased air activity in the area opposite Formosa. There is now [redacted] evidence that Soviet armament is being supplied to the Chinese Communist Navy and a submarine flying a Chinese Communist flag has again been reported at Dairen. Reports that Soviet submarines are patrolling the northern Shantung coast are not confirmed.

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3. INDOCHINA: The recent southward movement of two Viet Minh divisions into northern Annam may foreshadow Viet Minh attacks against French positions in Annam and lines of communication between Annam and Laos. There is increasing French concern in Indochina over the possibility of Chinese Communist intervention. There are continued indications of Chinese Communist supply of equipment to the Viet Minh, and work on the Chinese railroad to the Indochina border is reportedly being rushed.
4. BURMA: The U.S. Embassy in Rangoon has reached the conclusion from numerous reports that the Chinese Communists are committed to a program of aid to the Burmese Communist Party and that this aid has been under way for several months.
5. GERMANY-AUSTRIA: There have been no significant changes in the disposition of Soviet troops in Germany or in the pattern of field training. A total of about 80,000 troops are now estimated to be in the two major rifle army training areas opposite the Western Zonal borders. There is continuing evidence that a troop rotation program, involving the return of the 1927 class to the U.S.S.R. for demobilization, is under way in Germany, but there are no indications as yet that the 1927 class in Austria is being discharged. The Berlin traffic question continues unresolved and renewed restrictions may be a Soviet effort to exert pressure on the Interzonal trade negotiations.
6. BALKANS: There are indications that two Rumanian air regiments are to be reequipped with MIG-15 aircraft. Recent information from refugees provides further confirmation that a program is under way to construct long runways in eastern Bulgaria and that some of these are being completed this summer. It is now apparent that the evacuations from the Rumanian frontier adjacent to Yugoslavia are on a very large scale. The area may extend to a depth of 30 to 40 miles, and there are indications of urgency in completing the program, which most Western observers consider has chiefly long-range implications. There is considerable evidence that reservists in Bulgaria are being called for refresher training but a report that a "partial mobilization" is being accomplished in this manner is not confirmed. Recent [redacted] observations tend to discount the presence of Soviet troops in southwestern Rumania and limited observations in Hungary suggest that Soviet troop activity there is normal.
7. OTHER SATELLITES: Recent field trips by Western observers through eastern Czechoslovakia and central and southwest Poland revealed no unusual military activity. The estimated strength of the Polish Army has been increased from 180,000 to 200,000 on the basis of evidence that callups last autumn were larger than previously reported, and an unconfirmed report states that the Army is to be increased to 22 divisions and 225,000 men by the end of 1952. Polish Air Forces training in jet fighter aircraft continues.

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CONCLUSIONS

1. The Soviet Armed Forces in being are in an advanced state of readiness for war and could initiate offensive operations with no additional warning. Military and political indications are that the Communists intend to insist upon a solution of controversial problems strictly along lines which further Communist world objectives. There are no indications that the Soviets and their Communist allies, in pursuing their major objectives, intend necessarily to avoid future actions which might precipitate global hostilities.
2. Strong indications of a continuing Communist military build-up in Korea and Manchuria point to the Communist intention to continue the struggle if they fail to secure their objectives by political means.
3. There are continuing indications of Chinese Communist military assistance to the Viet Minh and the Burmese Communists.
4. Available intelligence does not indicate Soviet intentions to initiate hostilities in Europe or the Near East in the immediate future. There are, however, continuing military and political indications of Soviet and Satellite preparations for war, including the further tightening of border security measures and the reequipping of the Satellite air forces.

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ANALYSIS OF INDICATIONS

1. Indications of Intentions in the Far East.

a. KOREA.

(1) Cease-fire proposal. Communist commentary and action during the week with respect to the proposed cease-fire in Korea continue to provide no firm indication of a change in Communist policy in Korea. Although the Communists, in agreeing to a meeting of military representatives, have shown a willingness to discuss the "first step" proposed by Malik, there has been no substantial indication of the nature of the guarantees which they will ask or their terms for a political settlement. Other than the clarification by Gromyko that the cease-fire discussions would be limited to strictly military questions, there has been little further commentary from Moscow. Communist propaganda in general, however, is making increasing reference to a settlement and has emphasized that the U.S. is being "forced by world opinion" to ask for a cease-fire. The reasons for the Communist request to postpone cease-fire discussions until 10-15 July are problematical, but they may include a desire to build up propaganda for the event and also possibly to coordinate plans in view of previous indications that the Soviet proposal may have been a sudden one. According to a [redacted] report, purportedly originating with North Korean officials, North Korean peace terms call for a withdrawal of all U.N. forces, after which the North Koreans envisage that South Korea will readily fall from the effects of internal subversion and guerrilla warfare. A second report states there is a rumor among North Korean officers that the Soviets have promised the North Korean Government to secure the withdrawal of the U.N. forces from Korea, after which the North Korean Army, with increased Soviet logistical support and the aid of additional North Korean troops now training in Manchuria, will again attack South Korea. Although both these reports may be without foundation, it is probable that the Communists believe that the current negotiations may assist them to secure their objectives eventually. Numerous indications of the continued strengthening of the Communist military position suggest that the Communists are attempting to negotiate from a position of strength and are using the breathing spell to enhance their capabilities for further military action should they fail to gain their objective by political means.

(2) Ground. Communist military activity in Korea during the week and further reports that the U.S.S.R. is providing military equipment to the Chinese Communists indicate that

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a military build-up in Korea and Manchuria is continuing. Although action on the front was largely confined to patrolling, vehicle sightings continued to be substantial and an unusually large number of tanks was observed on one occasion on the east coast area. Communist PW's continue to report enemy plans for another offensive and some have stated that the late June offensive was postponed to mid-July. PW's have also reported the presence of four new Chinese Communist armies in Korea in addition to a division of the 47th Army which was identified last week. Another report that a Chinese Communist mechanized corps has moved from Yangdok to Koksan is consistent with earlier reports that a CCF mechanized force of 30,000 troops had arrived at Yangdok in early May, although its existence remains unconfirmed. PW statements that the Soviets have been reequipping CCF units in Korea meanwhile remains the most reliable evidence that such a program is probably under way. Although only a piecemeal commitment of Soviet materiel has been noted to date, the latest PW reports assert that the U.S.S.R. began to supply the CCF with large quantities of materiel after the first of the year. PW interrogations have identified all weapons of the Soviet World War II rifle division in CCF hands. Reports [redacted]

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[redacted] state that the U.S.S.R. has now supplied equipment for a total of 22 Chinese Communist divisions and that this equipment has been distributed to other areas as well as Manchuria. Although additional reports that Soviet troops in substantial numbers are entering Korea are discredited by other available evidence, the presence of Soviet AA troops in small numbers in North Korea, particularly in the Pyongyang area, has been reported previously and is well established.

(3) Air. Although there were no significant new developments in enemy air activities during the week, recent information further substantiates the continuing increase in Communist defensive air capabilities. Evidence indicates an extension of the MIG-15 defense of Manchuria. The airfield at Ta Tung Kou, southwest of Antung, is now an operational base, and further south, near Tientsin, the field at Han Tsun is reportedly operational with the types of aircraft unreported. A field report states that, whereas previously 80% of enemy flak hits in Korea were on aircraft flying below 1,000 feet, about 50% of hits now are on aircraft flying above 1,500 feet. The majority of hits are by guns ranging from 20 to 40 mm, and aircraft are being hit at all altitudes up to 5,400 feet. It is to be noted that this has occurred since reports of the appearance of Soviet AA personnel in Korea. Reports [redacted] may also reflect a significant increase in Chinese Communist bomber and airborne capabilities in the Korean-Manchurian area. [redacted]

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Although the CCAF is now estimated to have only 150 light bombers (Tu-2's), the combined Chinese and Soviet air strength in the area is estimated to include approximately 1,400 light bombers.

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This report is not confirmed and no Chinese Communist airborne divisions have been identified, although considerable evidence of Chinese Communist airborne training has been previously reported.

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b. JAPAN. The North Korean regime has sent a note to the U.S.S.R. asking to participate in the drafting of the Japanese peace treaty. This development further underscores the Communists' concern with the Japanese question and implies that after the Korean issue is settled, the problem of Japan is to receive even greater attention.

c. CHINA. Two recent reports of joint Chinese Communist maneuvers in South-Central China may indicate that these forces are attaining a higher degree of readiness. Large-scale air and ground maneuvers were conducted in the Nanking area between 20-23 June. Joint army, navy and air maneuvers were recently conducted in the vicinity of Swatow under the supervision of Soviet advisers. There are also reports of renewed Communist air activity in the area opposite Formosa, although photo reconnaissance of several weeks ago showed little air

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activity in this area. According to one report avgas is being airlifted to Foochow where the repair shops are fully manned and where there are approximately 20 light bombers and from 20 to 60 fighters. Take-offs and landings occur by day and night, but no bombing or gunnery practice has been observed. Near Asoy, the completion of reconstruction work at Machiang Airfield and the presence of large numbers of air personnel at or near the field has been reported. However, similar reports of activity in this area were not verified by air reconnaissance. Photographic evidence that three Chinese Communist frigates in Shanghai have been equipped with Soviet AA armament which is still standard in the Soviet fleet and with surface search radar is considered a significant instance of Soviet material assistance inasmuch as Chinese Communist ground and air forces probably enjoy a higher priority than the navy. The presence of a submarine at Dairen flying the Chinese Communist flag has again been reliably reported. [redacted]
19 Soviet coastal-type submarines are patrolling the Shantung coast between Chefoo and Weihsien. There is no other evidence of the transfer of this type submarine away from Siberian waters.

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d. INDOCHINA. Although recent Viet Minh activity has been on a small scale, the southward movement of two Viet Minh divisions into northern Annam may foreshadow Viet Minh attacks against French positions in Annam and lines of communication between Annam and Laos. It is apparent that recent Viet Minh activities, together with the possibility that the Chinese Communists may make a face-saving move to offset their reverses in Korea, are causing increasing concern to the French. General De Lattre publicly stated at a press conference this week that CCP advisers are becoming increasingly numerous in the Viet Minh army. U.S. attaches in Saigon believe that the recent Korean developments, together with the movement of Viet Minh divisions southward, changes in CCP dispositions in South China, and road and railroad construction work in the Indochina border area point to the probability of Chinese Communist intervention in the near future. A recent press report states that the Chinese Communists are rushing completion of the railroad which will connect Nanning with Chennankuan on the Indochina border, but [redacted]

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[redacted] believes that the target date of mid-July will not be met. A report that Hainan Island is no longer to be used as a supply point for the Viet Minh may be a result of the effectiveness of French patrol activity in recent months but will not adversely affect the flow of supplies to the Viet Minh because of the availability of land routes. There are continued indications of the supply of equipment to the Viet Minh from Communist China.

e. BURMA. On the basis of numerous recent reports and the significant shift of Burmese Communist insurgents towards the Sino-Burma border, the U.S. Embassy in Burma has concluded that the Chinese Communists are committed to a program to aid the Burmese Communist Party and that such aid has been under way for the past few months. Most of the supporting information and the conclusion that the aid program is under way have been covered in previous Watch Committee reports. A recent claim by Than Tun, CCP leader, that he has never signed a pact with Mao Tse-tung

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is contradicted by other evidence and is probably designed to avoid charges that the BCP is subservient to the Chinese Communists.

f. THAILAND. There has been no clear evidence of Communist involvement in the recent abortive coup in Bangkok. The dissident navy and marine faction which kidnapped the Premier referred to itself, however, as a "liberation Party and Army," typical Communist terminology in Asia. There have been previous suggestions that ex-Premier Pridi Phanomyong, who generally has navy support, might seek Communist support in returning to power, but there is no firm indication that Pridi was actually involved in this attempt.

2. Indications of Intentions in Europe and the Near East.

a. GERMANY - AUSTRIA.

(1) Soviet Ground Forces. There have been no significant changes in the previously reported disposition of Soviet troops or in the pattern of Soviet field training in Germany. In the Letzlinger Heide area opposite the British zonal border there are an estimated 40,000 troops, including two divisions of the Third Shock Army, the two tank divisions previously reported there, and small elements of six other divisions which do not normally train in this area. In the Eisenach-Ohrdruf area near the U.S. zonal border Soviet troops in training, also estimated at 40,000, include the four divisions of the Eighth Guards Army together with elements of three other divisions. The apparent concentration of troops in the Third Shock and Eighth Guards Army areas is not believed to be an indication of immediate hostile intent but gives the Soviets an increased potential for launching a surprise attack in considerable force at any time. Remaining divisions in the Soviet zone are disposed either in other training areas or are still at their normal garrisons, with training being carried out in nearby areas. The training pattern continues to be generally similar in nature to that of June-July 1950.

(2) Troop movements. Soviet troop movements in and out of Germany continue to be reported but present information remains too fragmentary to assess with accuracy the total numbers involved. [redacted] through 27 June reflects an estimated incoming strength of 18,000 troops offset by an outgoing movement of 9,000 to 11,000, suggesting that a troop rotation program is probably underway involving the recently conscripted 1951 class and the 1927 class now being discharged. In Austria 8300 new Soviet troops are now estimated to have arrived at the Wilfleinsdorf reception and demobilization center between 30 May and 29 June. Although the arrivals are considered normal, there continue to be no firm indications that the class of 1927 is being discharged in Austria.

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(3) Berlin traffic problem. The Berlin traffic question continues unresolved. East German traffic authorities have ruled that certificates of origin must still accompany a number of categories of goods being shipped from West Berlin to West Germany. With Interzonal Trade negotiations now underway, it is possible that the renewed restrictions represent a Soviet means of exerting pressure to influence the course of the negotiations. Of possibly related significance also is the recent request by the Russian section of the Berlin Air Safety Center that notification of intended flights in the Berlin corridors be given the day before. This suggests a possible attempt to make the use of the corridors more difficult.

b. BAIKANS

(1) Satellite air. The Commander in Chief of the Rumanian Air Force is reportedly in Moscow to discuss the equipment of two Rumanian air regiments with MIG-15 aircraft. These regiments according to the report will be the first to be equipped with MIG's. In the light of recent reports of pilot training in this type plane at Ziliscea airfield, the formation of the units is possible. In Bulgaria, further evidence tends to confirm the program previously reported underway to construct long runways in the eastern part of the country. According to refugees who allegedly worked on the fields, the runway at Bezmer - approximately 9,000 feet long - has been completed, and the construction at Balchik of a 7300 foot runway is scheduled for completion by 1 September. In addition to these two fields, which lie in the Black Sea coastal plain, work is reported at Harmanli/Ivanovo and Malevo Airfields in southern Bulgaria near the Greek-Turkish border. The report states that more than two hundred aircraft are to be stationed at the latter field.

(2) Evacuation Programs. There are indications that evacuation programs previously reported underway in Hungary and Rumania are continuing. Evacuations from Budapest are in their 6th week, with several reports now suggesting that assignment to the countryside is merely the first step and that able-bodied persons are moved again to "unknown destinations". From Rumania the U.S. Minister reports that the large-scale evacuations along the Rumanian western frontier are likely to extend the full length of the Yugoslav border and up to a depth of 30 or 40 miles. [] is reported to have counted nine evacuation trains of about thirty cars each west of Braila within a twenty-four hour period. Estimates indicate that up to 50,000-75,000 persons may have been evacuated already. Some urgency is evident in

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that (a) the evacuation is taking place in this important agricultural region before the harvest, which will inevitably be affected adversely despite special government efforts to insure a general harvest success in this first year of the Romanian five-year plan; and (b) the evacuation has been carried out with such speed that transportation facilities have been overburdened, thus causing several serious accidents. The consensus among Western representatives in Bucharest remains, however, that the measure probably is intended for long-term security purposes related to both border control and military considerations.

(3) Bulgarian army. There are indications that the Bulgarian Law for compulsory military service, which provides that all members of the reserves be called to duty periodically for refresher training (at least once every three years), is being implemented. Bulgarian refugees [redacted]

[redacted] state that there has been a "partial mobilization" of the 1919, 1920, 1924, and 1926 conscript classes for a 40-day period of training with new Soviet weapons. Reports from other sources confirm that reservists from classes prior to 1927 have been recalled to duty for refresher training. There is no reliable information available on the number of reservists involved and while it is possible that a "partial mobilization" could be undertaken under the guise of a call-up for refresher training, there are no indications that the call-ups have been on that scale.

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(4) Soviet forces. In Hungary, elements of the Soviet 2nd Guards Mechanized Division at Szekesfehervar appear to be engaging in normal activities and apparently had not moved out for summer maneuvers as of 27 June. A report that Kecel (south-central Hungary) was to prepare billets for 5,000 Soviet troops has not been substantiated but the town is in a known maneuver area and the 2d Guards Mechanized Division could logically move there for training. There are no indications of unusual Soviet troop activities in Rumania. [redacted] refugees from Rumania recently reported variously that Soviet truck convoys had arrived in Constanta from the north, that others had left Constanta for the south loaded with troops, that Soviet troop strength at Constanta had increased considerably in the first half of 1951, and that several Soviet officers had moved into headquarters at Pitesti in early June. The possible arrival of the 1931 class in Rumania as well as seasonal training activity may explain the troop convoy reportedly passing through Constanta. However, [redacted] passing through Pitesti in mid-June stated that he observed no Soviet troops there. He likewise reported an absence of Soviet troops or vehicles elsewhere on his 550 mile trip through southern and central Rumania.

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
c. OTHER SATELLITE AREAS.

(1) Czechoslovak and Polish Armed Forces. There are indications that there is no unusual military activity under way in Czechoslovakia or Poland. [redacted] who completed a motor trip in late June eastward from Prague to the Soviet frontier, covering some of the major cities in Czechoslovakia (Brno, Nitra, Banska, Bystrica, Kosice, Slov N. Mesto, Presov, Zilina, Olomouc), stated that he had observed no Soviet troops, no unusual military activities and only normal rail traffic. Similarly in Poland, the U.S. Assistant Army Attaché observed no unusual activity on a recent field trip through central and southwest Poland. Some training areas were occupied by Polish troops, but no heavy equipment was seen and the observed train movements included only small amounts of Soviet equipment. In a recent estimate the Army Attaché concluded that, by the end of 1951, twelve of Poland's sixteen divisions may be fully trained and equipped and that, from all available indications, unit and staff organization conforms to the Soviet pattern. Presumably these forces could thus be integrated easily with Soviet troops or operate independently. The estimated strength of the Polish Army has now been raised from 180,000 to 200,000 on the basis of additional information which indicates that call-ups of conscripts of the 1929 and 1930 classes in the autumn of 1950 were larger than previously reported. [redacted] the Polish Army is scheduled to be expanded further by the end of 1952 to a strength of 22 divisions and 225,000 men.

(2) Polish Air Force. Type 28 jet fighter aircraft at Warsaw/Bornowo Airfield, previously accepted as part of the Polish Air Force, have now been observed bearing Polish Air Force markings. Formation flights of up to four aircraft have been observed.

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